Turkish Arms in Sudan: Emerging Evidence from UN & Media Reports

Recent UN panel reports, investigative journalism, and multiple media outlets point to increasing use of Turkish-manufactured weapons in the conflict in Sudan. Key among these are Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci combat drones, electronic warfare capacity, as well as smaller weapons, supplied to or utilized by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

A Washington Post investigation claims that Baykar, a leading Turkish defense firm, delivered at least $120 million worth of drones and warheads to the SAF in 2023. This included eight Bayraktar TB2 drones, ground control stations, and hundreds of warheads. The deliveries were reportedly supported by Turkish technical personnel on the ground. 

Simultaneously, UN and other reports have flagged smaller Turkish arms—rifles from firms like BRG Savunma, Husan Arms, and UTAS—found in the hands of militias and non-state actors in South Sudan and Sudan. These appear to be recently manufactured, suggesting active export or diversion rather than use of old stockpiles. Questions are raised about export licensing, oversight, and whether some of these sales violate arms embargoes. 

Legal & Normative Violations: Breaches of Commitments and Laws

The supply of these weapons raises serious legal concerns. Sudan is under various UN sanctions, arms embargoes, especially concerning Darfur, and is the scene of an ongoing civil war between the SAF and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Exporting or facilitating weapons use in conflict zones implicates international humanitarian law, arms control treaties, and UN Security Council resolutions.

Turkey has laws requiring that its military exports be approved by multiple bodies— the Presidency of Defense Industry (SSB), the Armed Forces, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The emergence of Turkish weapons in conflict zones where they are not legally licensed suggests gaps in oversight, or possibly violations. 

Moreover, if drones such as TB2 and Akinci are used to direct strikes that hit civilians or civilian infrastructure, this could amount to war crimes or serious violations of IHL. The Washington Post reporting includes evidence of civilian harm. 

Strategic & Regional Implications: Red Sea, Maritime Security, and Power Projection

Turkey’s involvement via advanced drones and military exports has implications beyond the immediate battlefield in Sudan. For one, positioning support to Burhan’s forces enhances Turkish strategic footprint in the Horn of Africa, including along the Red Sea—one of the world’s vital maritime corridors. Trade through the Red Sea accounts for a significant portion of global shipping; destabilization there endangers global trade, energy shipments, and international commerce.

The supply of UAVs like TB2 and Akinci, which provide long-range attack, surveillance, and electronic warfare capacities, shift the balance of power on the ground, but also in surrounding airspaces. The presence of such systems complicates maritime security: drones can be used for reconnaissance of naval shipping, possibly threaten ports or transit points, or force adversaries to deploy costly countermeasures.

Humanitarian Consequences: Civilian Harm, Displacement, and Deepening Crisis

The military advantage conferred by Turkish drones has likely accelerated offensive operations. These operations appear to have led to more displacement, greater destruction of infrastructure (including health, food supply, logistics), and in many places, civilian casualties. The Washington Post piece refers to airstrikes carried out with Turkish drones that destroyed civilian targets (warehouses, markets, etc.). 

As these military operations intensify, so does the humanitarian crisis: millions displaced internally, many more refugees, risk of famine or severe food shortages, collapse of basic services. The burden on international humanitarian actors increases accordingly.

Double Standards & Narratives: What Turkey Says vs. What Evidence Suggests

Turkey officially often presents itself as a mediator or seeks to maintain neutrality in public discourse. But the accumulating documentation (contracts, end-user certificates, flight data, media/videographic evidence) suggests more active involvement on the side of the SAF.

There is a tension between what Turkish legal norms require (strict export controls, oversight) and what seems to be occurring on the ground. Moreover, the claim of neutrality is undermined when Turkish firms are directly supplying systems and training, as some reports assert. 

Risks to Regional & European Security, and Turkey’s Image

For Europe and regional actors, Turkey’s actions risk undermining stability. Spillover effects could include refugee flows into neighbouring states, arms proliferation beyond the conflict zone (into South Sudan, for example), and destabilization of trade routes. Turkey may face diplomatic pressure, sanctions, or reputational costs among its neighbors and European states, especially if these supplies are found to violate UN embargoes or international norms.

Legal accountability could also be sought. International courts or UN mechanisms could investigate whether Turkey violated arms embargoes, or whether there are breaches of international humanitarian law linked to their weapons’ use. For Turkey’s own defense industry, continued involvement in conflicts under such scrutiny could lead to export restrictions, loss of trust, or sanctions by other countries.

Gaps in the Evidence & What Remains Unproven

It should be noted that some claims are still under investigation and not all have been confirmed by independent sources. For example, while the Washington Post’s documentation is strong, some Turkish official denials persist. Some reports of TB2/Akinci use are indirect or based on sources whose credentials are still being evaluated. Electronic warfare systems supplies are less clearly detailed in public documents. The UN panel has more explicit citations for small arms, licensed rifle diversion, etc., than for drones in some cases. Also, distinguishing between direct Turkish state orders and the actions of private firms operating under license or via intermediaries remains complex.

Turkey’s role in the Sudanese conflict, as evidenced by recent investigative journalism and UN panel reports, suggests that its supply of drones (TB2, Akinci), warheads, and small arms is significantly shaping the conflict dynamics. These supplies raise serious questions about compliance with international law, risk exacerbating humanitarian suffering, and threaten regional stability. For Turkey, the stakes are high: its international reputation, its legal obligations, and its strategic ambitions may all be undermined if these allegations are substantiated and no corrective steps are taken. The European community and global institutions have both the moral and legal responsibility to scrutinize such interventions closely.